

Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /011 R

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DRAFTED BY: S/S-O:RBMCMULLEN

S/S-O:RELTZ

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 060913

EXDIS TOSEC 93

FOLLOWING REPEAT USNATO 1652 SENT ACTION SECSTATE MAR. 26,

QUOTE

S E C R E T USNATO 1652

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJECT: ATLANTIC RELATIONS: DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR DE
STAERCKE

DEPT PASS SECRETARY'S PARTY

1. AMBASSADOR DE STAERCKE CALLED ON ME ON MONDAY, MARCH
25 TO DISCUSS VARIOUS ASPECTS OF ATLANTIC RELATIONS. FIRST,
HE WANTED ME TO KNOW THAT HE AGREED WITH THE VIEWS OF THOSE,
INCLUDING SYG LUNS, WHO BELIEVED THAT A SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE
LINK BETWEEN THE U.S. AND EC, AS OUTLINED BY FORNMIN SCHEEL,
WOULD WEAKEN THE ALLIANCE. IN FACT, HE THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE
THAT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT COULD MARK THE BEGINNING OF A SERIOUS
DENIGRATION OF THE ALLIANCE. TO MY QUESTION AS TO WHY EIGHT
MEMBERS OF NATO WOULD SUPPORT THIS PROPOSAL IF THERE WAS

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A WIDESPREAD SENTIMENT THAT IT WOULD UNDERMINE THE ALLIANCE,
DE STAERCKE RESPONDED THAT THE NINE MIGHT FEEL THAT THEY

ARE UNDER ATTACK; AND THAT THE SCHEEL PROPOSAL WOULD BE ATTRACTIVE TO WASHINGTON, AND THAT THEREFORE IT WOULD SOLVE THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM. IN SHORT, ACCEPT THE SHORT-TERM SOLUTION AND WORRY ABOUT THE LONGER-TERM PROBLEM LATER. DE STAERCKE'S OPINION WAS THAT SUCH A SOLUTION COULD EVENTUALLY CREATE A MORE SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR THE NINE AND FOR NATO THAN THE PRESENT PROBLEM OF CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE NINE. DE STAERCKE SAID THAT ALL THE PROGRESS THAT EUROPE HAD MADE HAD BEEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE.

2. BOTH SPEAKING ON A PERSONAL BASIS, DE STAERCKE AND I THEN DISCUSSED THE GENERAL SITUATION IN EUROPE. I MADE THE POINT THAT IN MY VIEW THE NINE WERE IN FACT MAKING LITTLE SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS TOWARD EUROPEAN UNIFICATION; THAT WHEN THEY FAILED TO MAKE PROGRESS ON ONE OF THE TOUGH KNOTS ON THE ROAD TOWARD UNIFICATION IN THE ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL AREA, THEY HAVE TENDED EITHER TO MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF CONSULTATIONS ON SUBJECTS WHICH HAVE BEEN INHERENTLY PROPER FOR NATO CONSULTATIONS SUCH AS CSCE, OR ELSE MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF DEVELOPING A POSITION WHICH IS REMARKABLE ONLY FOR ITS DISTANCE FROM THE U.S. SUCH SUBSTITUTE ACTIVITY, I STRESSED, IS DETRIMENTAL TO THE TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP. RATHER THAN ASKING THEMSELVES WHAT THEY COULD DO FOR EUROPEAN UNIFICATION REGARDLESS OF ITS IMPACT ON THE ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP, EUROPEANS SHOULD ASK THEMSELVES WHAT THEY CAN DO FOR EUROPEAN UNIFICATION THAT IS EITHER NOT HARMFUL TO OR PREFERABLY IS HELPFUL TO THE ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP. I RECOGNIZE THAT ACHIEVING UNITY IS NOT EASY, BUT THE FRUSTRATIONS OF FAILURE SHOULDN'T BE DIRECTED IN WAYS THAT ARE HARMFUL TO THE ALLIANCE. I ALSO COMMENTED THAT IN MY VIEW THE DILEMMA THAT EIGHT OF THE NINE SEEMED TO THINK THEY FACE WAS IN FACT A FALSE DELEMMA. IT WAS NOT THE CASE THAT AN ACT WHICH WAS CONSTRUCTIVE IN THE ATLANTIC CONTEXT AUTOMATICALLY DENIGRATED THE EUROPEAN UNIFICATION MOVEMENT NOR WAS IT TRU THAT A CONSTRUCTIVE ACT IN THE FIELD OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION AUTOMATICALLY WAS IN OPPOSITION TO THE ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP.

3. DE STAERCKE SAID THAT SINCE THE ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP WAS SO MUCH MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE EFFORTS TOWARDS UNIFICATION OF THE NINE WHICH, IN FACT, WERE NOT MAKING MUCH PROGRESS

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RECENTLY, THAT ON REFLECTION HE WAS INCREASINGLY OF THE OPINION THAT POSSIBLY THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS OF THE NINE SHOULD BE LESS ACTIVE IN THEIR POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS. HE SAID POSSIBLY THE FIFTEEN SHOULD PROBABLY MOVE AHEAD IN THIS FIELD AND LEAVE THE NINE IN EFFECT ON THE FRINGE. I SAID THAT I FELT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO TALK ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NINE ON THE ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP THAT I HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED FROM TIME TO TIME BECAUSE THE COUNCIL WAS NOT DISCUSSING THIS BASIC QUESTION. I MENTIONED THAT THE COUNCI MIGHT CONSIDER DISCUSSING THE SUBJECT IN A RESTRICTED SESSION OF AMBASSADORS

PLUS ONE.

4. AMBASSADOR DE STAERCKE ASKED ME WHAT I THOUGHT ABOUT THE FORCES AT WORK IN THE UNITED STATES. I SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE WERE NOT TRYING TO THREATEN THE NINE BUT THEY WERE TRYING TO STATE THE FACTS AS THEY EXIST FORCEFULLY SO THAT HOPEFULLY THE PROBLEM FINALLY GETS SOLVED. THE BEHAVIOR OF THE NINE DURING THE PAST YEAR HAD REVEALED SOME PROBLEMS WHICH UNDERLINE THE QUESTION OF THE SUSTAINABILITY OF THE ALLIANCE, THAT SEC. STATE RAISED IN HIS APRIL SPEECH, GIVEN THE PERCEPTIONS IN THE U.S. OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN EUROPE. THE SAID THING, I COMMENTED, WAS THAT THERE HADN'T REALLY BEEN SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARDS EUROPEAN UNIFICATION IN THE PAST YEAR AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF EUROPEAN UNITY CANNOT BE MEASURED IN A PERIOD OF SIX TO TWELVE MONTHS BUT RATHER IN SIX TO TWELVE YEARS. DURING THIS TIME AND AFTER THE ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP WOULD REMAIN OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE, AND WHAT THE EUROPEANS DID IN THAT TIME SHOULD NOT DENIGRATE THE ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP AND SUCH AN APPROACH NEED NOT SACRIFICE POSSIBILITIES FOR REAL SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS TOWARDS EUROPEAN UNIFICATION.

5. DE STAERCKE'S FINAL SUGGESTION WAS THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO CONTINUE WORK AT THIS TIME ON THE DECLARATION OF THE FIFTEEN UNDER THE ASSUMPTION THAT THERE WOULD BE A DECLARATION OF THE NINE, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME RECOGNIZING THAT THERE MAY NOT BE A DECLARATION WITH THE NINE AND EXPLAINING WHAT A DECLARATION OF FIFTEEN WOULD LOOK LIKE ON THAT ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTION. I REPLIED THAT I DOUBTED THE U.S. WAS READY TO GO AHEAD ON THIS BASIS UNTIL WE HAD SOME RESPONSE FROM THE NINE TO THE CONVERSATION SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD WITH GERMAN AMBASSADOR VON STADEN OR UNTIL IT WAS CLEARER THAT THERE WOULD BE NO ACCEPTABLE ANSWER.

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DE STAERCKE SAID HE WOULD RAISE THE MATTER IN THE PERMREP LUNCH ON TUESDAY, MARCH 26.
RUMSFELD

UNQUOTE RUSH

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, POLITICAL SITUATION, PROPOSALS (BID), DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 27 MAR 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: garlanwa
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974STATE060913
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: O:RBMCMULLEN
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: P740145-1190, D740065-1008
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740311/aaaaajtg.tel
Line Count: 156
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: garlanwa
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 04 JUN 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <04 JUN 2002 by rowelle0>; APPROVED <03-Sep-2002 by garlanwa>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ATLANTIC RELATIONS: DISCUSSIONS WITH AMBASSADOR DE STAERCKE
TAGS: PEPR, PFOR, US, BE, XN, NATO, EEC, (DE STAERCKE), (SCHEEL)
To: MOSCOW
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005